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Chapter 1 of this volume has disaggregated how we might think about
state capacity as a process that moves from historical origins, organiza-
tional (bureaucratic) capacity, political deployment, and performance,
with perhaps organizational capacity being the most important. Insofar
as the state does not have sufﬁcient resources, a signiﬁcant and productive
presence in society, a trained and professional civil service, and insti-
tutional coherence, political deployment and performance are likely to
suffer. Yet generating sufﬁciently capable state organizations is far from
automatic; taxes may be difﬁcult to extract, state agents predatory or ill
equipped to deal with the challenges they face, societies apathetic or
indeed outright hostile to state programs. Since these are exactly the kinds
of circumstances in which state-making elites in the developing world ﬁnd
themselves, we need to ask ourselves how nascent and weak state insti-
tutions might actually generate capacity to implement initiatives and
programs. Is successful or unsuccessful policy implementation simply an
indicator of preexisting state (in)capacity, or can successful policy imple-
mentation actually lead to greater state capacity in that particular arena
of state action?
The policy process – from elite preference formation in settling on what
ought to be done, to mobilization and management of lower reaches of
state organization to execute what should be done, to coalition formation
with key sectors in society, and to communication about the new rules of
the game to wider publics – remains surprisingly opaque and delinked
from this larger problem of building state capacity. In deeply rent societies
coming out of long periods of militarized conﬂict through either civil war,
invasion, or decolonization, it is often imperative for aspiring state
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builders to engage in all of these activities simultaneously. Worse, they
must typically do so under conditions of unproven capacity, extant state
organizations of questionable loyalty, sectors of society that ﬁrst need to
be deﬁned and organized in order to be favored or discriminated against,
and norm dissemination to societies that may well be suspicious, fearful,
and cynical about the deployment of state power. Thus how aspiring
state-makers conceptualize what ought to be done, understand what
is possible within the structural constraints of the resources (human,
economic, and infrastructural) in which they operate, and adopt strat-
egies for implementing their preferences under conditions of limited
state capacity is as important as it is understudied. Political will from
above is a necessary but insufﬁcient element of successful policy imple-
mentation. Implementation of new core programs ultimately depends on
mobilizing the commitments of those in relevant state organizations
lower down, and success in either enlisting or bypassing the sectors of
society most affected.
In order to explore the processes within the “black box” between
preference formation and policy implementation, this chapter compares
the land-reform programs implemented in the early years of regime consoli-
dation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China
(ROC)/Taiwan in the early 1950s. While we are now used to thinking
of the PRC and the ROC/Taiwan as examples of particularly capable states
in terms of their promotion of rapid development, few would have pre-
dicted these successes in 1950. In the middle of the twentieth century,
China was desperately poor, politically and socially fragmented, and in a
state of economic collapse. This was not surprising, given that China had
also undergone more than a generation of almost ceaseless militarization
and warfare. The one-party states that arose over the course of this grim
historical sequence were the “revolutionary” People’s Republic of China,
which won the Chinese civil war, and its rival “conservative” Republic of
China, now relegated to the backwater of island Taiwan. The PRC and
ROC/Taiwan stand as exemplars of two supposedly diametrically opposed
approaches to state-building – the revolutionary and mobilizational versus
the conservative and top down. Yet, in the early 1950s, each staked a huge
amount of its legitimacy on the successful prosecution of land reform, and
both were by any standard successful, despite the extraordinary challenges
they faced in so doing.
I suggest that the reasons for this success lie in the way each deployed
two key modalities of administrative policy implementation: (1) the “bur-
eaucratic” and (2) the “campaign.” The bureaucratic mode is the stuff of
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which “state institutions” are made: formal organizations, hierarchical
lines of authority, rule making, and rule implementation. It is heavily
precedent-oriented, and impersonal, as the same rule by deﬁnition is
applied to the same categories of people, things, or situations. The cam-
paign is deﬁned by a delimited period of intensive focus on a particular
program or set of goals. It is launched by political elites, is implemented
by state organizations, and then spreads by varying degrees into society.
In contrast to the bureaucratic modality, campaigns are by deﬁnition
extraordinary. They seek to engage emotional commitments, often side-
stepping or overriding the procedural and rule-bound. They may spread
beyond the bureaucracy to engage and mobilize signiﬁcant segments of
the population, with unpredictable consequences. Despite these profound
differences in mode of implementation, campaigns cannot completely
undercut the formal institutions of the state and their well-known tenden-
cies to hierarchy, formal structure, and precedent-based rule making; after
all, campaigns require committed state agents to run the campaign. In
policy environments in which “regular” bureaucratic functioning is insuf-
ﬁcient, the very process of implementing a focused campaign condenses
and accelerates normally sequential processes (preference formation, coali-
tion creation, bureaucratic mobilization, and wider norm dissemination).
Under these conditions a well-executed campaign can serve to dramatic-
ally expand state capacity by simultaneously ﬁring up the commitments of
state agents, expanding their numbers, and lowering social resistance to
regime programs. Conversely, an unsuccessful or damp-squib campaign
can fail to organize, mobilize, and engage the commitments of implement-
ers and end users alike.
the “two chinas” and the “necessity” of
land reform circa 1950
This chapter considers the state’s dramatic campaigns of (re)distribution
through land reform in two particular geographical regions of greater
China in the early 1950s: (1) China’s Sunan region south of the Yangzi
River, centered on Shanghai, which was then (as now) the wealthiest area of
the People’s Republic of China, and (2) the island of Taiwan, to which the
vanquished Nationalist (Guomindang, GMD) government had retreated
following its defeat in 1949. At the time of land reform, communist-
dominated movements of national liberation had either marched to victory
or seemed to be on the verge of doing so in China, Korea, and Vietnam. By
mid 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War had prompted US aid and
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support to shore up noncommunist competitor regimes. All were, with
good reason, obsessed with internal and external security.
There was little reason to be sanguine about either the PRC or ROC/
Taiwan in 1949–50. Both were highly militarized party-states that ruled
primarily by coercion. Neither possessed a capable, well-run civil service,
and both had very shallow roots in local society. The Chinese Communist
Party’s long years of revolutionary struggle in the impoverished country-
side of north China meant that it had little to no penetration of city or
countryside in central, south, and west China, where it came in as an
army of occupation. For its part, the Guomindang on Taiwan had so
thoroughly mismanaged “recovering” the island from Japanese colonial
rule after 1945 that within two years it found itself having to quash an
island-wide uprising. In 1949 it was widely despised by local Taiwanese
as corrupt, brutal, and alien. Within four to ﬁve years, though, each of
these Chinese regimes was well consolidated, solidly aligned on opposite
sides of the bipolar international system, and on an accelerating trajectory
that made it an archetypal case of either radically revolutionary state
making from below or conservative-controlled state making from above.
The “successful” land-reform campaigns of the early 1950s, and the ways
in which they were written into contemporary justiﬁcations of regime
legitimacy illustrate in microcosm how the very process of implementing
land reform strengthened the state organizationally, demonstrated regime
legitimacy and commitment to social justice, and instructed the popula-
tion into its core values.
Whether draped in the rhetoric of either the PRC’s popular mobiliza-
tion and mass revolution or the ROC/Taiwan’s restorationist conserva-
tism, state-makers in the new People’s Republic and the not-so-new but
now revitalizing Republic of China/Taiwan, held in common a core of
state-making agendas that was deeply authoritarian and fundamentally
transformative. While both ruled by coercion, each was eager to build up
alternative sources of legitimacy, silence real or presumptive enemies,
garner the acquiescence of core social groups, and fundamentally reorder
rural relations. This agenda in turn required additional state capacity to
(1) remove all sources of real or imagined opposition to regime initiatives,
(2) create a range of state institutions that systematically subsidized and
privileged the urban over the rural while not appearing to do so, and (3)
communicate a new political language and set of norms to the population
at large. For both moral and instrumental reasons, land-reform programs
were an integral component of this wider agenda. Ensuring a modicum of
social justice in the countryside through redistribution was an intrinsic
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moral imperative: The failure to have done so was widely understood to
be why the Guomindang lost the civil war. More instrumentally, mean-
ingful land reform could break the power of sitting rural elites, allow the
regime to penetrate to the grassroots of the countryside, and pave the way
for the reorganization and reincorporation of the countryside on terms
determined by the party-state.
campaigns and states: repertoires of
intensive implementation
Translated into English as “[social] movement” or “campaign,” the term
“yundong” is fraught with ambiguity. In China’s Republican period
(1911–49), yundong denoted two very different phenomena: (1) social
movements from below that challenged state weakness in the face of
external imperialist pressure, and (2) communist and Nationalist efforts
in party, military, and state organizations to intensify focus and imple-
mentation around particularly deﬁned objectives. After 1949, the term
came to be almost exclusively associated with the People’s Republic of
China as the revolutionary regime trumpeted its successful Three Great
Campaigns (against US involvement in the Korean War, against “coun-
terrevolutionaries,” and for land reform), in establishing a “mass line”
uniting mobilized masses with the government. In contrast, the ROC/
Taiwan government seldom used the term “yundong.” In order to distin-
guish itself from its bitter rival across the Taiwan Straits, the ROC/
Taiwan party-state deﬁned itself in terms of rules, procedures, precedent,
and sober regularity. But the ROC/Taiwan’s reluctance to use the term
did not mean that it did not conduct campaigns.
If the notion of yundong is broadened to mean a period of extraordin-
ary government intensiﬁcation, drawing on a repertoire of speciﬁc prac-
tices to enable that intensiﬁcation, and deploying that extraordinary focus
to implement a particular policy, then it is clear that both the PRC and the
ROC/Taiwan launched campaigns. These drew on a venerable lineage
from the late imperial state as well as the speciﬁc practices of Leninist (re)
organization from the 1920s.1 There was a spectrum of campaign activ-
ity. The minimalist variant simply geared up the bureaucracy for an
extraordinary deployment of material and human resources to achieve a
particular goal. This sort of campaign (such as the annual push to tax the
1 For the ways in which the late imperial state used campaigns, see R. B. Wong 2012.
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harvest) expected little in the way of mobilization or social change outside
the state itself. At the opposite extreme, a maximal campaign, such as the
PRC’s actions against landlords or counterrevolutionaries, or the Great
Leap Forward of 1958, aimed for a close-to-universal mobilization of
society in support of regime goals. In between was a range of different
types: Campaigns could be geared to one-time problems (for instance,
draining a swamp). Others targeted relatively small and/or easily
delimited groups in society who were expected to exhibit major behav-
ioral changes (for instance, campaigns to wipe out prostitution or opium
use). At their most limited, campaigns involved bureaucratic gearing up
and intensiﬁcation; at their most maximal, they also led to highly visible
full social mobilization in support of regime goals.2
Although campaigns presupposed the existence of a cadre of commit-
ted state agents, under normal circumstances campaign modalities were
inherently in tension with the bureaucratic organizations of the state.
Mao Zedong’s discomfort with the revolutionary state’s tendencies
toward bureaucracy may have been legendary, but even in revolutionary
China state agents had to be organized vertically into hierarchical and
responsive organizations. Insofar as hierarchical state organizations tend
toward the complex of behavior that Weber called “bureaucratic” – regu-
larity, impersonality, rule making, standardizing, expertise-dependent, and
precedent-driven – the extraordinary intensiﬁcation, concentration of pol-
itical and administrative action, and disregard of precedent and rules
characteristic of the campaign modality normally undercuts the key fea-
tures of bureaucratic modalities in state organizations.3 But the success of
PRC and ROC/Taiwan’s land-reform programs in the early 1950s sug-
gests that this is not always the case: Under conditions of early regime
consolidation an intelligible campaign can indeed expand state capacity
through rapid identiﬁcation, training, and deployment of newly commit-
ted state agents to take on extraordinary, heroic roles. In their respective
abilities to harness campaign modalities of policy implementation to state-
building capacity generation, the “revolutionary” PRC and the “conserva-
tive” ROC/Taiwan had much more in common than met the eye.
2 Of course, not all campaigns are effective: they can be unfocused or unclear in their intent,
involve sloppy training or inappropriate slogans, mobilize those who are unsure of why
they are being mobilized, have a host of unintended consequences, or simply peter out
because the subjects of a campaign are alienated or bored.
3 For the classic statement of Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, see Weber 1946,
196–203.
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overlapping agendas and campaign articulation:
why remake the countryside through
land-reform campaigns (1950–1953)?
The state-making elites of the PRC and the ROC/Taiwan took land
reform incredibly seriously. Staking a big part of their legitimacies on
its successful completion, both pushed through sharp, aggressive land-
reform campaigns between 1950 and 1953. Both also insisted that the
manner in which the campaign was carried out was as important as the
result. The ﬁrst question is why. Land reform as a precursor to collectiv-
ization may have been de rigueur in the early regime consolidation of
Marxist-Leninist regimes the world over, but outside Japan and South
Korea, where land reform was implemented in whole or in part by the US
military, why did a “conservative” regime aligned with the United States
implement a meaningful land-reform program rather than simply pay lip
service to the notion? The ROC/Taiwan state amassed both the political
will and the administrative capacity to push through a serious land-
reform redistribution in a way that other “conservative” regimes of the
time (such as the Philippines and Thailand) did not. The typical factors
cited to explain the ROC/Taiwan’s commitment to and successful imple-
mentation of land reform include Taiwan’s small scale and the ruling
GMD’s lack of political obligation to the Taiwanese landlord class in the
countryside. While entirely sensible, this line of reasoning does not quite
explain why Guomindang felt it so important to visibly demonstrate its
effectiveness in land reform in Taiwan, or why it took such pains to
distinguish itself and its tactics from the ongoing land-reform campaign
in the PRC. Similarly, once the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to
push through land reform in Sunan in 1950–51, why was it so insistent
that land reform in central China replicate not just the required outcome,
but the actual processes of earlier experiences in north China of “making
revolution” through popular mobilization, free-ﬂowing emotion, and
public demonstrations of popular support?4
The rationale for these deep attachments seems to lie in the way in
which political leaders interpreted the successes and failures of their
recent histories. Despite their differences on the question of class struggle,
the political leaders of these rival Chinese governments subscribed to a
complex of overlapping notions for legitimate state action that derived
4 See W. Hinton 1966; Crook and Crook 1968.
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from a much longer tradition of imperial statecraft and agrarian empire:
(1) an assumption that properly socialized and motivated state adminis-
trators are able to overcome objective circumstances through proper
application of morality and will, (2) a deep suspicion of any associational
activity not overseen and deemed legitimate by the state, and (3) a
normative commitment to the state’s role in ensuring subsistence and
approximate social justice.
The PRC’s and ROC/Taiwan’s rhetorical framings and relevant diag-
noses of rural problems that “demanded” land reform also converged with
the dominant global developmental norms of the mid twentieth century.
Whether Leninist/revolutionary or liberal/modernizing, all shared a distaste
for the “inefﬁciency” of smallholder-based, “fragmented” agriculture and
professed an afﬁnity for the big, visible, and noticeable projects emblematic
of mid-twentieth-century modernity: concrete, dams, infrastructure, and
factories. Each further assumed that the state had to extract as much as it
could from agriculture to ﬁnance industrialization and other modernization
projects. Both diagnosed the key ills of China’s agricultural hinterland to be
economic stagnation, severe inequality, fragmentation, and pressure on
landholdings. Therefore, land reform was essential for immediate social
justice and the further economic development that only increases in agri-
cultural productivity could bring about.
Discussion of land reform was framed by the presumption that it was
economically desirable (to lay the groundwork for further consolidation
and efﬁciency in agriculture), socially necessary for equity, demanded from
“below,” and politically paramount: Indeed, the very legitimacy of the
regime in the countryside was presumed to depend on its successful imple-
mentation. These propositions were extrapolated from the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s own relatively successful experiences withmaking revolution
in the impoverished countryside of north China in the late 1940s. All
were also highly questionable when applied to the much wealthier and
more diversiﬁed rural economies of Sunan and Taiwan, where tenancy
was already in decline, landlords were weak, and migration to urban areas
in search of factory work was well established. What mattered for these
campaigns were the perceptions of necessity, social justice, subsistence guar-
antees, and legitimacy that framed land reform for state-building elites.5
5 These assumptions can be found in virtually all of the propaganda on the importance of land
reform in both China and Taiwan, as well as by Westerners able to observe the prosecution
of land reform in north China villages in the late 1940s. See Pan 1951, 198; Shi 1951,
88–89. See also W. Hinton 1966; Crook and Crook 1968; Chen 1960; and Tang 1955.
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Despite their signiﬁcant differences in ethos (violence vs. inclusion), type
of implementing organization (class-based revolutionary party vs. techno-
cratic administration), and ofﬁcial rate of implementation (speed in China
and deliberately slow sequencing in Taiwan), the trajectory of land reform’s
campaign implementation in Sunan and Taiwan was broadly similar. The
steps consisted of: (1) a preparatory stage that involved meetings, internal
information dissemination, and training of extraordinary numbers of staff
to implement the campaign, (2) intensive propaganda aimed to educate the
rural population about the necessity, desirability, and mechanics of the
program, (3) the creation of local representative organizations (peasant
associations in the PRC and rent-reduction committees later transformed
into farmer/tenant committees in Taiwan) to support the campaign, (4) the
intensive assessment, checking, and ofﬁcial recording of who owned what
land, backed up by the dispatch of outside leaders to guide and check on this
process, (5) the actual redistribution of “excess” land to those in ofﬁcially
designated land deﬁcit, and (6) review and rechecking of the results.
The content of the early to middle stages of land-reform campaigns was
also nearly identical: Both vastly expanded state capacity by recruiting and
dispatching newly deputized state agents to the countryside. The imple-
mentation of policy required generating substantial amounts of new state
capacity. Conducting preliminary investigations, generating and revising
records, creating and disseminating enormous amounts of educative propa-
ganda, and soliciting popular rural support for the program while retaining
full control over both process and outcome did not happen automatically.
These elements of land-reform campaigns occurred because the state con-
centrated organizational effort and resources to (1) expand the size of the
bureaucracy and (2) lower social resistance to the land-reform program. In
both Sunan and Taiwan, this meant training very large numbers of people,
often young, to go down to the most grassroots level of the countryside to
aid implementation. In Sunan, land reform went hand in hand with a
substantial expansion of the ranks of basic-level cadres in the countryside.
In the Shanghai suburbs alone, some 460 lecturers from local universities
and middle schools were trained and sent to the countryside to implement
land reform, accompanied by 4,616 activists, largely from poor peasant
backgrounds. Once in the countryside, a substantial minority never left;
more than one-ﬁfth (1,042) of these activists were eventually regularized as
permanent cadres then entrusted with running later rural campaigns.6 For
6 SMA (Shanghai Municipal Archive) B14/1/80, “Shanghai shi jiaoqu xunlian ganbu shu
peiyang jijifenzi qingkuang” (The situation for Shanghai municipal outer district cadre
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the wider Sunan region, the Sunan Party Village Work Committee targeted
the training of an eventual 11,333 cadres to cover the three districts of
Suzhou, Changshu, and Songjiang.7
Similar training exercises took place in Taiwan under the auspices of
the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), which was a
small agency for rural development jointly run by Americans and Chinese
agricultural economists. Its function was to draw up plans and provide
training for local Land Bureaus (dizheng chu) under the auspices of
the Taiwan provincial government to extend their reach down to every
village and hamlet. The JCRR oversaw the training of more than 4,000
staff workers to implement a rent-reduction program (sanqiwu) between
1949 and 1952. It repeated the exercise in 1952 when it trained an
additional 2,000 people to carry out the speciﬁc technical work of
checking and reentering of landownership record cards for the entire
cadastre of land under cultivation on the island in preparation for the
Land to the Tiller program of 1953 (gengzhe you qitian).8 The culmin-
ation of land reform with the Land to the Tiller initiative also required
top-up training of administrators already in place in Taiwan’s Land
Bureaus at provincial, county, and district levels. Provision was also made
for supplementary technical training for an additional 2,400 ﬁeld
workers, and extra training of the 3,000-odd members of local Farm
Tenancy Committees and 6,537 hamlet and section chiefs.9
The state also put a great deal into propaganda. This meant persuading
large numbers to mobilize in support of the state’s program to go down to
the countryside to convince rural populations that these new policies were
reasonable, comprehensible, and absolutely necessary. Publicity about
land-reform programs was disseminated widely in the national, regional,
and local press. In Sunan pamphlets were reproduced in simple language,
often with use of cartoons, laying out basic questions and answers to
illustrate the gravity of exploitative feudalism in the countryside and the
training and the cultivation of activists), and “Sheng tudi gaige qianhou xiangcun jiceng
ganbu bianhua qingkuang tongjibiao” (Statistical form on changes in village level local
cadres before and after land reform), both p. 13 of internally numbered ﬁle, dated Dec. 31,
1951; SMA B14/1/6, “Jiaoshi canjia tudi gaige di’yi xiaozu mingdan ji duiyuan tongji-
biao” (Instructors participating in land reform: the ﬁrst small group name list and statis-
tics), 1951.
7 JPA (Jiangsu Provincial Archive) 3006-3-360, “Benhui [zhonggong sunanzu dangwei
nongcun gongzuoweiyuanhui] Sunan ganbu xunlian tongjibiao” (Chinese Communist
Sunan group party village work committee Sunan cadre training statistics), 1950.
8 Tang 1955, 50–51. 9 Ibid., 116.
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government’s measures for resolving this deplorable situation.10 More
upmarket versions of printed propaganda were aimed at intellectuals. In
the spring of 1951, Pan Guangdan and other senior academics from
Beijing were taken on a study tour of land conditions and the process of
land reform in Sunan. The resulting publication reads as a conversion
experience: being awakened to the suffering of the peasantry and deep
inequality in the countryside, the correctness of the CCP’s categories of
class analysis, and absolute support for the notion that the evils engen-
dered by feudalism required total overthrow by the Chinese Communist
Party.11 Finally, propaganda was taken straight to the villages with small
group meetings, and popular entertainment featuring plays emphasizing
the drama and righteousness of land reform, further blurring the bound-
ary between education and entertainment.12
Given the virulent ideological hostility between the two regimes,
propaganda dissemination in Taiwan was astonishingly similar. In prep-
aration for the Land to the Tiller program, the JCRR’s itemized budget
for project publicity was even larger than its training budget. Speciﬁc
forms of propaganda and publicity, and means of dissemination, were
nearly identical: Cartoons, movies, songs, and plays accessible to rural
villagers were commissioned and then intensively deployed. Once writ-
ten and rehearsed, these dramatic performances were scheduled to be
performed at the rate of one per every three villages throughout Taiwan.
The JCRR subsidized the projection of a reel of educational slides about
the Land to the Tiller program to be run in more than 120 cinemas. The
JCRR also blanketed the island with paper that explained, exhorted,
and entertained; fully half of its large printing budget was devoted to
publicity materials, many of which entertained as much as they
informed: cartoons, movie synopses, posters, pictures, and the texts of
the locally performed plays along with more mundane copies of pro-
gram regulations.13
diverging campaign repertoires i: planning the show
The CCP and the GMD are normally thought to be utterly unalike
because of their sharp differences on class struggle and physical violence,
10 See Tao and Wang 1951. 11 Pan 1951. 12 Xiao 1950.
13 GSG (Guoshi Guan [Academia Historica]) 313/1285-3 FY 52, “A Preliminary Budget
Estimate for the Private Land Purchase Project in Taiwan,” prepared by Taiwan Land
Bureau, April 1952.
Campaigns of Redistribution 349
and it is certainly true that this basic philosophical difference was at the
core of the ways in which these two regimes’ repertoires diverged over
the course of land reform. The CCP trumpeted the cleansing power of
struggle, including physical violence, while the GMD shied away from
explicit struggle whenever possible, preferring to conduct its violence
out of sight. The CCP explicitly and deliberately used land reform as a
way to engage in a project of investigation and classiﬁcation of the
countryside, ﬁxing class labels on the basis of occupation for individual
families that would remain permanent; the GMD made every effort to
encourage individual movement between different occupational statuses
(from tenant to freeholder, and from landlord to state capitalist). ROC/
Taiwan political elites went to extraordinary lengths to distinguish
themselves and their land-reform programs from the violent and evil
Other on the opposite side of the Taiwan Straits. This was implicit in the
rhetoric, but it was also explicitly laid out in private discussions within
the government.
One ROC/Taiwan Executive Yuan internal meeting went as far as to
lay out the parameters of the conceivable for land reform. As the purpose
of the Land to the Tiller program was “to abolish an irrational system of
tenancy, to establish an open and fair system of private landownership,
and to return landownership to the tiller,” a chart was made up on an
oversized paper that was folded in on itself several times. The key features
of the communist land reform were listed on the left side of the paper, the
range of possibilities for the Nationalist version on the right. Throughout,
the possible options were negatively framed by the (presumed) goals and
repertoires of the communists: If those awful “gongfei” (communist
bandits) over there had engaged in class struggle and public humiliation
of landlords, then by deﬁnition we good and pure people over here could
only consider methods that explicitly ruled out class struggle and public
humiliation of landlords. If the communists had done x and y, then we
could only countenance engaging with what was clearly and demon-
strably non-x and non-y. For the Guomindang, the range of the imagin-
able for land reform was explicitly deﬁned in terms of what the CCP had
not done.14 These different choices not only expressed core philosophical
differences and bitter competition. They also were part of a much larger
process of mutual differentiation through visible, public performances
14 GSG 071.204, Xingzheng Yuan, Mishu chu, “Taiwan gengzhe you qitian yu gongfei
‘tugai’” (Taiwan’s Land to the Tiller and Communist Bandit “Land Reform”), August
2, 1953.
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that reiﬁed each regime’s own way of doing things while instructing the
population at large into that state-mandated good.
The actual performances of land reform in the two Chinas differed in
pace, staging, dramatic register, and the sorts of popular participation
solicited. In Sunan, land-reform performances necessarily required very
public forms of participatory theatre that were acted out in public space
through mass gatherings that were called variously “struggle meetings”
(douzheng hui) or “accusation meetings” (kongsu hui). Local cadres who
failed to “stir up the masses” (fadong qunzhong) were severely criticized
by their superiors, because one of the main goals of popular mobilization
was to socialize the population into new regime norms by having the
masses be stirred to active participation. In Taiwan land reform was
equally heuristic, but its land-reform performances demonstrated legal
procedure and due process. In Sunan, mass yundong required the fear and
anger of cathartic mass emotion; the graphically corporeal destruction of
the “old” (feudal, corrupt) as a form of cleansing and public identiﬁcation
with the “new” (modern, clean, and bright), now ﬁrmly identiﬁed with
the CCP’s right to rule and the legitimacy of the PRC. In Taiwan, the
ROC government, in cooperation with the JCRR, made every effort
possible to mobilize and channel emotion through procedures, best exem-
pliﬁed through highly controlled public voting exercises.
In order to support these two different conceptions of what the state-
enlightened subject was supposed to do, land-reform campaigns engaged
publics in very different ways by putting on very different sorts of shows.
The ﬁrst major difference was in pace. From beginning to end, land-reform
campaigns in Sunan took roughly eighteen months and concluded with a
mandatory “high tide” (gaochao) of particular intensity. In Taiwan, land-
reform campaigns lasted ﬁve years, and were designed to be deliberate
technical exercises.
In Sunan, ofﬁcial investigations into rural conditions and land reform
in experimental villages (shidian cun) dragged on throughout 1950.
During this trial period, it became clear that many local cadres doubted
that the land-reform campaign was necessary. The class categories of
exploiters and nonexploiters that had served as such potent mobilizers
in north China made little sense in wealthy, diversiﬁed Sunan, where
those who felt “exploited” had a habit of searching for, and ﬁnding,
work in factories in the city. The presumed reservoir of mass hatred for
rural “exploiting classes” was embarrassingly deﬁcient. Many peasants
resolutely refused to be “stirred up” and instead sympathized with the
putative “exploiters” in their midst. Given the large disconnect between
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rural Sunan’s conditions and the categories handed down from above,
many local cadres were initially reluctant to go out and stir up social
hatred against an exploitative class that did not exist. This noncompliance
was broken in November 1950, when the entire Sunan region sent cadres
to a specially convened land-reform conference in Shanghai, where local
ofﬁcials were put on notice that their excuses and foot-dragging would no
longer be tolerated. Predictably, the campaign then lurched wildly to the
left. The actual “high tide” of the campaign with its full repertoire of mass
meetings, public accusation, and assignment of the “fruits of struggle”
was conducted at different times throughout Sunan, but once underway it
was invariably pushed through extremely quickly.
The description below of land reform in Qingpu county, to the imme-
diate west of Shanghai, is indicative of how the campaign was imple-
mented in Sunan: “[B]y the end of August [1950], each district had seven
experimental areas that had implemented land reform; in the ﬁrst half
of September the second group of twenty-seven villages and one town
began . . . by the end of November, the entire county had ﬁnished up.”
Land-reform work went through the training of backbone (cadres),
propaganda mobilization, and division of classes. The county party
committee held three land-reform cadre training sessions that 451 cadres
attended, of whom 96 were land-reform work team members who were
sent to help with land-reform work in villages after participation in the
district experimental villages. The county Peasant Association convened
four Peasant Representative Meetings with 3,117 participants; 10,500
participated in district-level Peasant Representative Meetings, which
disseminated propaganda about the signiﬁcance and purpose of land
reform:
In the middle of land reform, the districts held a total of 1,072 public accusation
meetings; 137,000 participated, and [of these] 3,855 individual peasants
uncovered and accused landlord and evil bullies’ criminal behavior . . .
332,069 mou was taken from landlords, and the remaining 105,158 mou from
half-landlord half-rich peasants, rich peasants engaging in trade while renting
land, petty rentiers, and other kinds of public land. According to policy, this land
was distributed to poor peasants and hired laborers, middle peasants, and others
engaged in labor. In order to transform landlords into self-supporting laborers,
they were given a parcel of equivalent land. Undergoing the process of land
reform has realized “land to the tiller” [gengzhe you qitian]. Land reform . . .
through public meetings also redistributed landlords’ excess property of 426
carts, 371 boats, 370 head of water buffalo, 2,156 pieces of furniture, 4,786
dwellings, and 540,000 kg of grain to poor peasants and hired laborers. On May
15, 1951, the county government promulgated “land-reform house-ownership
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certiﬁcates” (also called “land-reform certiﬁcates”). These were distributed in
three batches, concluding at the end of July, with the issuing of more than
61,000 certiﬁcates.15
This ofﬁcial report makes it clear that the CCP put a premium on speed.
Once begun in a particular locale, mobilization, propaganda, mass accus-
ation meetings, and redistribution appear to have been condensed into one
intensively charged period of approximately two weeks. In the Shanghai
jiaoqu (outer districts), and in rural Shanghai county to the south of the
city, land reform was delayed until the spring of 1951 but, once underway,
“high tides” were of even shorter duration. In Shanghai county these
“high tides” took on average a week, and in some cases were completed
within only four or ﬁve days.16 Final registration of the results, record
keeping, and the hearing of appeals and resolution of difﬁcult cases and
border adjudication dragged on into 1952, but these were relatively simple
matters of bureaucratic tidying up.
The comparison with land reform in Taiwan is stark. In Taiwan the
architects of land reform went out of their way to adopt a gradualist
version of land reform. Ex post facto accounts of the land-reform process
suggest that land reform was accomplished via four carefully planned
and executed projects that progressed in natural sequence between
1949 and 1953–54.17 Ofﬁcially, the JCRR and the Nationalist govern-
ment jointly developed land reform out of four quite separate and delib-
erately gradual administrative initiatives that built on each other between
1949 and 1954: (1) the “375” rent reduction that limited tenant rents to
one-third of the crop (1949, but accelerating in 1951–52), (2) the sale of
public land (1951–52 at various points), (3) the rechecking and reregis-
tration of the entire cadastre (1952), and only then (4) the Land to the
Tiller program (1953, but comprehensively assessed and declared to be an
overwhelming success in 1954). The signature Land to the Tiller program
was designed to provide “reasonable” compensation to landlords and to
proceed incrementally, through a process whereby, after the landlords’
compulsory sale of excess land to the state and the state’s transfer of that
15 This and the previous two paragraphs are drawn from Ma 1990, 199–200.
16 MDA (Minhang District Archive) 13-1-37 “Shanghai xian guqu” (Shanghai county
districts). This map shows forty-eight districts in the county, with the dates of their ﬁrst
(preparatory), second (“high tide”), and third (“concluding”) phases of land reform. Of
these, twenty-three completed the second stage in a week or less, and twenty-three in one
to two weeks, none in more than two weeks, and two for which there is no information.
17 Chen 1960, 20; Hsiao 1953, 20; and Sino-American Joint Commission 1965, 7–12,
20–85.
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land to tenants, tenants were to redeem the value of the land through
installment payments to be completed over an additional ten-year period.
Explanations of land reform stressed its incrementalism, gradualism, and
reliance on material incentives. Even after the land was fully redeemed
after a decade, land reform was scheduled to then move into a “second
stage” of gradual land rationalization and consolidation in a gradual
and only distantly realizable future of efﬁciency and progress.18
In practice, land reform in Taiwan was not nearly as cleanly incremental
as these ofﬁcial narratives suggest. The apex of land-reform campaigns in
Taiwan, the Land to the Tiller program, is best understood as a dramatic
campaign of regime mobilization in response to the problems engendered
by the state’s more vigorous implementation of “375” rent-reduction
policy in 1951–52. To the dismay of the planners in the JCRR and the
Taiwan Land Bureau, rather than lessening social conﬂict in the country-
side, the attempt to enforce rent reduction in 1951–52 triggered wide-
spread evasion, unilateral lease cancellations, waves of disputes between
landlords and tenants, and political openings for left-leaning local ofﬁ-
cials and organizations to claim to be simply implementing the govern-
ment’s policy. Uncertainty over land tenure meant that land prices
dropped. Landlords complained bitterly about their sudden economic
precariousness. Local Rent Reduction Committees (sanqiwu weiyuan-
hui) established to resolve disputes between landlord and tenant were
utterly ineffective, as they were either landlord-dominated or existed only
on paper. In short, a more muscular approach to enforcing rent reduc-
tion led to the exact opposite of what it was designed to accomplish:
stability in the countryside. Thus the much less gradualist Land to the
Tiller program (gengzhe you qitian) was conceived and implemented in a
rush to correct these unanticipated results.
divergent repertoires ii: performing the campaign
Violence, either real or threatened, was at the heart of land reform, and
this was as true in Taiwan as it was in the People’s Republic of China.
What differed was how direct or implicit the violence was, its relative (in)
visibility, and how it became entangled with quite different forms of
representation and local participation. Ofﬁcials in both Sunan and
Taiwan presumed that regular, organized representation from “below”
18 On this process, which went well into the 1970s, see Bain 1993.
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was necessary for the successful implementation of such a life-altering
program in the countryside. Each made efforts to organize the grassroots
through popular election into Peasant Associations (for China) and Rent
Reduction Committees/ Farm Tenancy Committees (for Taiwan). The
formal Peasant Associations in Sunan were, however, typically bypassed
in actual decision-making. Although set up by the Chinese Communist
Party, Peasant Associations were distrusted on the grounds that they
could easily come to be dominated by rich peasants and landlords. In at
least one documented case in Miaoyang, Changshu, the “masses” openly
wondered why landlords could not join Peasant Associations and stand
for election as small group representatives.19 The Qingpu gazetteer cited
above suggests implicitly that land reform in Sunan was implemented by a
combination of actors: a local land-reform committee (often led by out-
siders appointed by the county government), external work teams, cadres
sent to the county seat for special training sessions, and pre-identiﬁed
local activists.20 The Peasant Association role appears to have been
conﬁned to propaganda dissemination and helping to get everyone to
public struggle meetings.
In Sunan, local participation in land reform was articulated through a
form of direct collective response unmediated by rules and procedures in
the public drama of mass struggle sessions. The CCP campaign reper-
toire required a “high tide” (gaochao) in which the masses were stirred
to action. And the only action that would do was a public mass chorus
that would articulate rightful hatred toward landlord exploiters. The
revolutionary state deemed this necessary as a ﬁrst step in raising popular
revolutionary consciousness, explicitly engineering a public rally around
the new government and garnering the public’s collusion in bloody vio-
lence against the state’s newly deﬁned enemies.
Despite their seeming spontaneity, mass struggle sessions were care-
fully planned in advance by local state actors. Cadres identiﬁed and
rehearsed activists and particularly sympathetic accusers (the very young,
the very old, women, and the obviously inﬁrm and handicapped) in when
to come forward onto the stage of the mass struggle session, and which
particular accusations to make. Land reform in Sunan followed perform-
ance scripts handed down from higher levels, and there was pressure from
on high to repeat the drama and emotionally led self-transformation
19 JPA 3006-3-371, Sunan tugai weiyuanhui mishuchu, “Guanyu fadong qunzhong wenti
de baogao” (Report on the Problems of Stirring Up the Masses), 1951.
20 Ma 1990, 199–200.
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deemed to be necessary to a “high tide” for it to “count” as successful.
Cadres at the Sunan regional administration were insistent that the spe-
cially chosen wronged “mount the stage” (shang tai) to engage in direct
“face-to-face” (mian dui mian) accusation and that the evil accused “pub-
licly acknowledge” previous crimes (chengzui) before the masses, “[as] . . .
without this kind of public acknowledgment of crimes the entire [process] is
fake.”21 The form of the mass accusation session gathered virtually the
entirety of the rural population as a unitary participant–spectator audience,
where the speciﬁc theatrical device of “speaking bitterness” (chiku) was
acted out by precoached activists and victims, and the “masses” publicly
merged as one with the state.
Records from Qingpu county, Shanghai county, and the Shanghai
outer districts conﬁrm that large numbers of mass struggle sessions were
convened and that the “targets” predetermined to be the most evil and
hated were promptly and publicly led off to the execution ground. Statis-
tics from Shanghai county convey the startling information that nearly a
third (224 of 779) of recorded “accusation targets” (douzheng duixiang)
were “strung up and beaten” (douzheng zhong bei diaoda) during the
course of these mass accusation sessions. Whether the state’s extreme
violence against those it labeled enemies of the revolution was wel-
comed is difﬁcult to determine. The record in Sunan is at present lacking
in the kind of detailed eyewitness accounts that convey whether public
accusation meetings were genuinely popular, if they brought about the
free-ﬂowing tears and spontaneous accusations that featured in the
land-reform campaigns of north China, whether they were the product
of a small minority, or if in fact they took place only with the conniv-
ance of local cadres.
A critical report on the difﬁculties of stirring up the masses compiled by
the Sunan Land Reform Investigation Unit in April 1951 suggests that in
many locales cadres had to overcome a great deal of natural reluctance on
the part of the “masses” to be “stirred” to physical violence. In one case in
Jiading county, Mawei district, Beiguan village, a local cadre clearly
incited the crowd to demand physical violence: From the middle of the
throng he shouted “go ahead and hit [the accused].” “From the stage
[where the accused and a peasant who was ‘speaking bitterness’ toward
the accused were standing], the district cadre instructed the man who was
‘speaking bitterness’ ‘if the masses say “hit him” then you have to go
21 JPA 3006-3-271, Sunan tugai weiyuanhui mishuchu, “Guanyu fadong qunzhong wenti
de baogao” (Report on the Problems of Stirring Up the Masses), 1951.
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ahead and hit him.’ But the man demurred from his appointed role to
‘speak bitterness’ with the repeated insistence that: ‘I’ve never hit anyone
before, and I will not hit him.’ As the crowd continued to bay for physical
violence, the designated accuser on the stage hit the accused, ultimately
resulting in seven or eight blows.”22 In other places, local cadres
dampened down the physical violence of accusatory theatre rather than
ratcheting it up. In Kunshan’s Yebi district, Yebi village, before the public
accusation session commenced, the cadre warned the gathered crowd that
“he [the cadre] was the one passing judgment, and that anyone who went
ahead and ‘strung up and beat’ an accused target would have to take
responsibility for so doing.” In another instance involving a particularly
despised “little tiger” (xiaohu), a local cadre by the name of Zhang
Zhihua refused to let the prisoner go to his appointed struggle session
on the grounds that, if the prisoner had to face the public, he would
deﬁnitely be beaten to death.23
Statistics claim that the majority of the rural population “participated”
in accusation sessions, but these were the aggregate numbers of those
who turned up for the public gathering. Formulaic reports uniformly
conclude that “the masses were stirred up” and that justice was done,
with resounding afﬁrmation for the state’s violence against class enemies.
More-detailed micronarratives suggest a much more mixed picture. Some
of the presently available accounts support the notion that the land
reform’s lurch leftward after November 1950 resulted in local cadres
who connived with activists to incite the “masses” to publicly denounce
and commit violence against chosen “targets.” Other evidence suggests
that local cadres limited the degree of uncontrolled violence that they
would permit on their watch. Within this variation, however, it is clear
that scripts handed down from superiors required a dramatic culmination
of “stirred-up” masses accusing evil landlords and reafﬁrming collective
unity with the state and its violence against deﬁned enemies. Sometimes
the public performance went well. In other cases it seems to have not,
given that in Sunan the dividing line between exploited and exploiters was
blurred, landlords were weak, social and economic mobility was high,
and in many places local people actually thought that their own local
landlords were not such bad sorts at all. We cannot know for sure about
something so variable and subjective, but it does stand to reason that
perhaps the masses were less enthusiastic than the large numbers of those
22 JPA 3006-3-271, “Guanyu fadong qunzhong douzheng de cailiao zhailü,” April 1951.
23 Ibid.
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in attendance at the mass struggle sessions would otherwise suggest. The
dramatic dénouement of state led retribution through public accusation
meetings followed the form laid down in north China in the late 1940s,
but how well the repertoire of staged private suffering, spontaneous
violence, and cathartic emotion played in the very different environment
of Sunan is still an open question.
The young PRC deliberately used theatre, and theatrical metaphors,
to describe this necessary “high tide” in the land-reform campaign.
Meaningful local input came into the process on what was literally a
(makeshift) stage, and popular participation was theatrically expressed in
ways that were diametrically opposed to the procedural and regularized
forms of participation in land-reform campaigns in Taiwan. In Sunan, the
public nature of the staging, the unitary and emotional narratives of prior
suffering, the visibly shackled representatives of evil personiﬁed encour-
aged the very reverse of procedure and rules – an unleashing of collective
emotion and fury that merged individual interests into collective identiﬁ-
cation with the group and the new regime. Although these were in fact
heavily stage-managed events, and the spontaneity of the accusations
levied and the importance of the crowd in determining the outcome
toward the accused were more apparent than real, it is not at all clear
at this early stage in regime consolidation that the “masses” understood
that the outcome of public struggle sessions was foreordained and that
their designated role was that of the chorus: to be stirred to emotion, to
cheer and clap on cue, and to collectively reafﬁrm the moral righteousness
of the regime in stamping out vicious enemies. The mass struggle meeting
was as much a heuristic device for educating the participants about the
new regime’s norms and rhetoric as it was a means for dispatching
individuals deemed to be enemies of the state. The state claimed to repre-
sent, reproduce, and make public the legitimate position and opinions of
“the masses”; the masses in turn learned what was expected of them
through in collective action in new forms of political participation unme-
diated by organizations or procedures. The staged public form of the mass
struggle session implicitly bloodied the hands of all of those who shouted
in support of the regime’s violence against enemies, and provided a sym-
bolic point of no return. After such a highly charged show of participatory
violence against deﬁned class enemies, things would never be quite the
same again. When the show went well, local participation and representa-
tion were thus articulated through a publicly afﬁrmed merging of crowd
and state; representation was fused in a dramatic unity with the state and
its agents.
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Local participation in land-reform campaigns was equally important
in Taiwan, but it could not have been more differently articulated.
Rather than emotional “stirring up” free-ﬂowing tears and violence,
provision was made from the outset to carefully mobilize and strictly
channel participation in highly regularized, indirect forms of procedural
representation. Land reform in Taiwan promoted two forms of this kind
of representation: Rent Reduction Committees (sanqiwu weiyuanhui)
(1949–51), which were replaced with much stronger Farm Tenancy
Committees (gengdi zudian weiyuanhui) in 1952. The Rent Reduction
Committees never worked as intended and either did not meet at all or
became vehicles for continued elite domination. In 1952, the combined
JCRR–government response was to establish an islandwide series of
Farm Tenancy Committees to replace the Rent Reduction Committees.
This was accomplished through another, quite literal kind of subcam-
paign: to hold islandwide indirect elections to these newly established
Farm Tenancy Committees. Thus, what was not ﬁt for purpose was
replaced with a very different kind of theatrical performance: the theatre
of the public, competitive election, followed by the more closed and
bounded performance of procedural rule application by the elected com-
mittee behind closed doors.
The ﬁrst round of elections for Farm Tenancy Committees was for
hamlet and section representatives. First a list of eligible voters was
compiled on the basis of rural occupational status (landlord, tenant, or
freeholder). Regular village and township ofﬁces screened the applica-
tions of prospective candidates and then publicly displayed the list. From
this public posting, each hamlet and section elected two tenant-farmer
representatives, one owner-farmer representative, and one landlord rep-
resentative. This process was then repeated for the township, county, and
municipality, with the total number of committee members slightly
weighted in favor of tenants.24
A good deal about these elections is unclear. We do know, however,
that after these open elections the new Farm Tenancy Committees worked
very closely with state bureaucrats in the Taiwan Land Bureau, which
gave compulsory two-week training courses to recent electees “to
acquaint them with their functions and responsibilities and the relevant
laws and regulations.”25 The head of the local Land Bureau served as an
ex ofﬁcio member of the Farm Tenancy Committee, and its decisions and
24 Tang 1955, 56–58; Walinsky 1977, 95. 25 Tang 1955, 59.
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minutes were reported to the Land Bureau up a level. Difﬁcult cases were
passed up to higher-level Farm Tenancy Committees, the district-level
dizheng chu, and more rarely the courts.
While much work remains to be done to ascertain the degree to which
these Farm Tenancy Committees had real rather than nominal power, it is
indisputable that a very large number of elected representatives (3,032)
were returned to staff these committees in the second half of 1952. These
local committees met regularly from 1953 through the late 1950s at least.
They had the authority to directly question those bringing the case and
those being accused in a quasi-judicial setting. And they formally handled
and made decisions on a very large number of adjustments to land-
classiﬁcation and land-related disputes. By one count between January
1952 and July 1956 township-level committees alone conciliated 31,759
disputes and referred 16,462 to the prefectural or city land-tenure com-
mittee. Of these 16,462, 9,418 were conciliated and only 5,321 were
referred to courts. Other evidence suggests that, within a fairly short
period of time, Farm Tenancy Committees began to take on larger roles
in local land disputes. For example, in 1955, a land dispute between the
sugar factory and the agricultural school in Yongkang, Tainan, was
brought before the Yongkang Town Farm Tenancy Committee. In an
echo of the way in which the late imperial Chinese state dealt with local
problems, the Guomindang’s preferred strategy was to blur the boundar-
ies of state and society by creating a committee of local stakeholders to get
them to take over some portion of the state’s work. The Guomindang
party-state went out of its way to provide for an institutionalized and
procedurally oriented form of participatory representation for local inter-
ests, with the bonus that this helped manage the workload of adjudicating
local land disputes. And, after the public but delimited theatre of the
initial elections, this work seems to have been done behind closed doors.
In both Sunan and Taiwan, the state organized local forms of repre-
sentation to seem as if they represented local popular desires. Both
favored particular groups while marginalizing or exterminating others.
However, the ways in which the state did so could hardly have been more
different. In Taiwan, carefully planned, procedural, and electoral forms of
local representation were designed to dampen down emotion. In Sunan
public, violent, emotional collective will was deliberately whipped up to
merge with the state. In Taiwan the public and participatory elements of
land reform were conﬁned to segmented, procedurally oriented elections,
after which rules and procedures were delegated to an elected committee,
whose deliberations and application of rules occurred in the enclosed
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space of the government ofﬁce. In contrast, the participatory theatre of
Sunan’s land reform fused implementation with a temporary but potent
emotional high in open public space. It was the campaign’s necessary
bureaucratic and procedural preparation and tidying up that were hidden
from view.
conclusion
What then, do these revolutionary and reformist variants of land reform
suggest for building state capacity in general and implementing redistribu-
tive programs in particular? The ﬁrst, fairly obvious point is that subject-
ive interpretation of what is desirable and possible matters for the
mobilization of political will behind a given policy. Insofar as state elites
have little immediate material stake, they will ﬁnd it much easier to
generate consensus around redistributive measures. Critical-juncture
notions of institutional change suggest that crises and periods of severe
irruption (such as after a major war) allow opportunities and spaces for
the creation of new practices and institutions.26 Crisis and disjuncture,
however, do not necessarily or even usually result in redistributive pro-
grams and augmented state capacity. One only needs to point to contem-
porary failure to more seriously regulate banking and credit markets in
the wake of the 2008 crisis, or the way in which the crisis of tensions in
the new state of South Sudan are as of this writing leading to an escalating
cycle of state incapacity rather than leading to the political will and
resource commitment to generate new state capacity. Even a cursory
review of land reform suggests that there are many more ways in which
to fail than there are to be successful. The PRC and ROC were unusually
successful in pushing through their own distinctive kinds of performances
in land-reform campaigns, but many more regimes at the time – including
the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India apart from Kerala, and most
states in Latin America – did not manage to muster either the political will
or the state capacity to implement analogous land-reform campaigns.
The young PRC was dedicated – to the point of obstinacy – to the
notion that its campaign repertoire of mobilizational “high tides,” face-
to-face accusations, and cathartic fusion of state and the masses was a
necessary part of revolutionary regime consolidation. Local cadres in
Sunan were initially bewildered, but complied. It was only after all the
26 Pierson 2003; Thelen 2000; Mahoney 2000.
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usual suspects (landlords, bullies, reactionaries, bourgeois intellectuals,
capitalists) had been dispatched that these repertoires of public struggle
against deﬁned targets began to turn inward, with predictably deleterious
effects. One can understand the escalating cycles of radical measures after
1954 – culminating with the collectivization campaigns and the disastrous
Great Leap Forward of 1958 – as the regime’s deep attachment to its
signature repertoires of campaign implementation, even under palpably
different circumstances than the ones that brought these techniques to the
fore. Similarly, the sheer level of political will behind the ROC–JCRR
version of gradualist land reform in Taiwan is inexplicable without
reference to the ROC’s instructively negative counterexperience. The loss
of the mainland had been such a searing process for GMD elites that once
on Taiwan they engaged in protracted soul-searching, emerging from a set
of frank discussions about the causes of their collapse in China with a new
consensus about what needed to be done as a matter of regime survival.
An absolute commitment to meaningful land reform was inseparable
from that new consensus.
Many states limp along with much less than was accomplished in the
PRC (revolutionary variant) and the ROC/Taiwan (conservative variant).
The case of land reform illustrates how, in two explicitly oppositional
regimes, the political will behind a redistributive program was converted
into a campaign that simultaneously expanded administrative capacity
even as it invited different kinds of public participation and communi-
cated regime norms. And it is here that repertoire and performance
become particularly pertinent. Although the particulars of repertoires
and performances necessarily vary, if they are comprehensible, justiﬁable,
and command a strong consensus within the higher reaches of the state,
they are likely to lead to a stiffening of commitments of state agents, state
projection to ever more grassroots of society, and acquiescence in core
sectors of society. Insofar as goals are unclear or contested, or repertoires
are weakly performed, campaigns launched with even the best of inten-
tions are not likely to result in either policy implementation or increased
state capacity.
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